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ABSTRACT 
2UJDQL]DWLRQV MRLQ LQWHURUJDQL]DWLRQDO QHWZRUNV LQ WKH KRSH RI JDLQLQJ H[SRVXUH WR OHDUQLQJ
RSSRUWXQLWLHVDQGDFFHVVLQJYDOXDEOHH[WUDPXUDOUHVRXUFHVDQGNQRZOHGJH,QWKLVSDSHUZHDUJXH
WKDW SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ LQWHURUJDQL]DWLRQDO QHWZRUNV DOVR UHGXFHV SHUIRUPDQFH GLIIHUHQWLDOV DPRQJ
RUJDQL]DWLRQDO QRGHV :H H[DPLQH WKUHH DOWHUQDWLYH PHFKDQLVPV FDSDEOH RI VXVWDLQLQJ WKLV
SUHGLFWLRQ7KHILUVWVWUHQJWKRI WLHVRSHUDWHVDWDVWULFWO\ORFDO OHYHOGHILQHGLQWHUPVRIG\DGLF
UHODWLRQV OLQNLQJ RUJDQL]DWLRQV 7KH VHFRQG PHFKDQLVP VRFLDO SUR[LPLW\ RSHUDWHV DW DQ
LQWHUPHGLDWH±RUPHVR OHYHORI LQWHUGHSHQGHQFHGHILQHG LQ WHUPVRIPHPEHUVKLS LQRYHUODSSLQJ
FOLTXHV LQWR ZKLFK LQWHURUJDQL]DWLRQDO QHWZRUNV DUH W\SLFDOO\ RUJDQL]HG 7KH WKLUG PHFKDQLVP
VWUXFWXUDOHTXLYDOHQFHLVJOREDODQGSHUWDLQVWRMRLQWO\RFFXSLHGQHWZRUNSRVLWLRQV7KHREMHFWLYH
RIWKLVSDSHULVWRH[DPLQHDWZKLFKRIWKHVHOHYHOVQHWZRUNHIIHFWVRSHUDWHWRUHGXFHSHUIRUPDQFH
GLIIHUHQWLDOV DPRQJ PHPEHUV RI LQWHURUJDQL]DWLRQDO QHWZRUNV 2XU HPSLULFDO DQDO\VLV RI
SHUIRUPDQFH GLIIHUHQWLDOV EHWZHHQ KRVSLWDOV LQ D UHJLRQDO FRPPXQLW\ VXSSRUWV WKH IROORZLQJ
FRQFOXVLRQV L SHUIRUPDQFH VSLOORYHU HIIHFWV DUH KLJKO\ GLIIHUHQWLDWHG DQG YDU\ VLJQLILFDQWO\
DFURVVQHWZRUNOHYHOVLLRUJDQL]DWLRQVRFFXS\LQJVLPLODUSRVLWLRQVZLWKLQWKHQHWZRUNDUHPRUH
VLPLODULQWHUPVRISHUIRUPDQFHLLLMRLQWPHPEHUVKLSLQPXOWLSOHVXE-JURXSVRUFOLTXHVUHGXFHV
SHUIRUPDQFH GLIIHUHQWLDOV XS WR D OLPLW DIWHU WKLV OLPLW LV UHDFKHG WKH SHUIRUPDQFH RI
RUJDQL]DWLRQDO SDUWQHUV EHJLQV WR GLYHUJH LY WKH VWUHQJWK RI GLUHFW FROODERUDWLRQ EHWZHHQ
RUJDQL]DWLRQDOSDUWQHUVGRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\ UHGXFH LQWHURUJDQL]DWLRQDOSHUIRUPDQFHGLIIHUHQWLDOV
7KHUHVXOWVRIWKHVWXG\DUHQHZEHFDXVHDYDLODEOHUHVHDUFKRQLQWHURUJDQL]DWLRQDOQHWZRUNVVD\V
OLWWOHDERXWWKHUDQJHRIQHWZRUNHIIHFWV±LHDERXWKRZIDUWKHSHUIRUPDQFHVSLOORYHUHIIHFWVWKDW
RSHUDWH WKURXJK QHWZRUNV SURSDJDWH WKURXJKRXW RUJDQL]DWLRQDO ILHOGV DQG FRPPXQLWLHV 7KHVH
UHVXOWV DUH DOVR FRQVHTXHQWLDO EHFDXVH WKH\ VXJJHVW WKDW QHWZRUN HIIHFWV RQ SHUIRUPDQFH
GLIIHUHQWLDOVDUHVHQVLWLYHWRWKHVSHFLILFDWLRQRIQHWZRUNERXQGDULHV 
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INTRODUCTION 
Students of organizations and management demonstrate an increased interest in the role of 
interorganizational relations as joint problem solving arrangements established by interdependent 
organizations to support, control, and coordinate flows of material and symbolic resources (Cropper 
et al., 2008). The basic argument behind this interest is that connected organizations are better able 
to manage the uncertainty inherent in their mutual dependencies, recognize and access key 
resources across corporate boundaries, and learn from each other by sharing and transferring 
relevant knowledge and information (Powell et al., 1996). Interorganizational networks provide 
access to the competitive and operational experience of others resulting in best practices that can 
then be more easily understood, evaluated and, possibly, assimilated (Ingram and Baum, 1997).  
Examples of research building on this perspective include studies of strategic alliances 
(Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Stuart, 2000), collaborative manufacturing (Helper et al., 2000), 
interlocking directorates (Haunschild, and Beckman, 1998; Haunschild, 1994), joint ventures 
(Polidoro, Ahuja and Mitchell, 2011), and models specifying organizational outcomes as a function 
of the quality, status, and prestige of network associates (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Stuart, Hoang 
and Hybles, 1999). 
In all these examples of interorganizational networks, organizations are assumed to establish 
collaborative agreements in the hope to learn and benefit from the experience, resources, and 
capabilities of network partners (Powell et al., 1996). Establishing collaborative relations is 
DWWUDFWLYH SUHFLVHO\ EHFDXVH QHWZRUN WLHV PD\ ³3URYLGH XQLTXH RSSRUWXQLWLHV WR OHDUQ IURP SHHU
ILUPV DQG KDYH D GLVWLQFWLYH FDSDFLW\ WR PRWLYDWH PHPEHUV WR VWULYH IRU KLJKHU SHUIRUPDQFH´
(Sgourev and Zuckerman, 2011: 13). Thus, organizations establish collaborative relations under 
expectations that assimilation of extramural resources, competencies and skills that network ties 
afford will eventually yield higher levels of individual performance (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
However, if this expectation is generally satisfied, then the aggregate outcome is that performance 
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differentials between connected organizations will decrease as a direct consequence of the reduced 
diversity in the set of organizational capabilities and skills present in the network (Han, 1994). 
In this paper, we seek to clarify how - and to what extent - this assimilation process 
sustained by network ties affects performance differentials among participants in 
interorganizational networks. Our work extends prior research in two ways.  First, we show that 
network effects on interorganizational performance differentials operate differently across 
structural levels. With few exceptions (Provan and Sebastian, 1998), available research has been 
conducted at one single level of analysis (Provan, Fish and Sydow, 2007). We estimate models that 
specify how the strength of direct partnership (social interaction), co-membership in cliques (social 
proximity), and shared network position (structural equivalence) affect interorganizational 
differences in performance. The underlying idea guiding our analysis is that if interorganizational 
relations have implications for organizational performance, they should be revealed by variations in 
performance differentials between connected organizations. Because networks are multi-level 
constructions, this objective involves identifying the mechanisms that bound performance 
assimilation effects across network levels. How far do network effect on performance spill over? 
We know that networks influence behavior. We simply do not know the range of such influence 
which may vary from the very local (individual network ties) to the global (network positions, or 
roles). To the best of our knowledge no research is available that has addressed this question 
directly in the context of organizational fields and communities. 
Second, while most prior research has IRFXVHG RQ ³QHWZRUN HIIHFWV´ RQ LQGLYLGXDO
performance, our interest in this paper is on differences in performance between connected 
organizations ± with unconnected organizations used as case controls. This stance is consistent with 
our objective of establishing the level at which network relations affect interorganizational 
performance differentials. Are organizations connected by network ties more similar in terms of 
performance than organizations that are not connected? And if this is the case, at what level are 
these differences more clearly observable? With the partial exception of Mizruchi and Marquis 
4 
 
(2006) we are not aware of research that has attempted to address these questions directly despite 
the clear tendency during the last decade or so to study networks at the level of dyads (Stuart, 1998; 
Rivera, Soderstrom, and Uzzi, 2010). The analysis we present provides unambiguous answers to 
these questions while allowing for the possibility that interorganizational performance differentials 
± which are necessarily dyadic - may not be best explained at the dyadic level.  
We situate our study in the context of original fieldwork and data that we have collected on 
an interorganizational regional community of hospital organizations. Interorganizational networks 
are particularly relevant for understanding organizational outcomes in the health care industry 
where ³0DQ\ RUJDQL]DWLRQV LQ D FRPPXQLW\ PD\ ZHOO EH FRQVLGHUHG SDUW RI D EURDGO\ GHILQHG
delLYHU\V\VWHPDQGFRQQHFWHGWRRQHDQRWKHULQDYDULHW\RIZD\V´Provan and Sebastian (1998: 
454). More specifically, our analysis focuses on the network of patient transfer relations between 
hospitals. We focus on this specific and well-studied interorganizational relation because prior 
literature has demonstrated that patient transfers represent an important occasion for reciprocal 
learning as they imply collaboration, knowledge transfer and information sharing between partner 
hospitals involved in the transfer (Iwashyna, 2012; Lee et al., 2011).  
In our study, the relational content is unambiguously specified and the strength of the 
relation accurately measured. Patient transfer between hospitals would not be possible without a 
considerable investments and explicit arrangements in support of joint decision making (Lomi et al. 
2014). As we explain later in the paper, patient flows represent the physical traces of complex 
arrangements established to support and facilitate interorganizational collaboration and joint 
decision making. For this reason patient flows represent a signal of an underlying collaboration and 
knowledge sharing between partner hospitals. Inter-organizational knowledge sharing is 
particularly important for organizations in fields where the knowledge base is complex and 
expanding (Powell et al., 1996; Uzzi, 1997) ± such as healthcare. 
 
7+(25(7,&$/%$&.*5281'$1'+<327+(6(6 
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7KHRUHWLFDOEDFNJURXQG 
$FFRUGLQJWR$QVHOO³$QHWZRUNFDQEHWKRXJKWRIDVDQLQVWLWXWLRQWRWKHH[WHQWWKDWLW
represents a stable or recurrent pattern of behavioral interaction or exchange between individuals or 
RUJDQL]DWLRQV´$VVXFKQHWZRUNVSOD\DUROHWKDWLV in many ways similar to that of the powerful 
collective actors that institutional theories have long identified as the main generators of 
isomorphic pressures within organizational fields (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Galaskiewicz, 
1985).   
We know, for example, that organizations connected by network ties are more likely to 
imitate network partners, assimilate their knowledge, and become progressively more similar along 
a number of meaningful dimensions (Galaskiewicz and Burt, 1991; Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 
1989; Greve, 1996; Rao et al., 2000). This happens because networks speed up the diffusion of 
practices, and make available salient information about the costs and potential benefits of adoption 
decisions (Davis and Greve, 1997; McDonalds and Westphal, 2003; Westphal and Zajac, 1997). As 
these and innumerable other studies demonstrate, membership in networks exposes organizational 
nodes to considerable mimetic pressures ± pressures to imitate, assimilate or emulate the behavior 
of partners.  Interorganizational networks clearly represent: "A context in which individual efforts 
to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint often lead, in the aggregate, to homogeneity in 
structure, culture, and output" (DiMaggio and Powell 1983:147). 
Considered as institutions, however, interorganizational networks present a number of 
distinctive features that require a more detailed organizational analysis. Two such features are 
directly relevant to our current purposes. The first is that mimetic pressures prevail on normative 
and coercive pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This is the case because interorganizational 
networks are based on the formation of decentralized cooperative relations between organizations 
that otherwise retain autonomy and control over their own resources (Ebers, 1997). Network nodes 
do not substitute market transactions with hierarchical relations (Williamson, 1991), but continue to 
operate as independent organizations (Powell, 1990). In interorganizational networks problems of 
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interdependence are solved by relational coordination ± D ³communication - and relationship-
LQWHQVLYH IRUP RI FRRUGLQDWLRQ´ *LWWHOO   LQYROYLQJ WKH FUHDWLRQ DQG PDQDJHPHQW RI
enduring network ties. Consequently, isomorphic pressures come from the accumulation of 
decentralized dyadic relations with partner organizations, rather than from the adherence to general 
institutionalized norms promulgated by the state and promoted by the professions.  
7KHVHFRQGGLVWLQFWLYHIHDWXUHRIZKDWKDVEHHQFDOOHG³QHWZRUN LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP´$QVHOO
2008) is that the internal structure of interorganizational networks is highly differentiated: Not all 
members of interorganizational networks have relations with all others, and relations tend to be 
highly clustered around a limited number of nodes. As a consequence, the overall network density 
tends to be low and members vary considerably in centrality and connectivity within the network 
(Baum, Shipilov and Rowley, 2003). The main implication of internal differentiation is that 
isomorphic pressures are distributed unevenly across networks. Membership in networks does not 
guarantee global homogeneity in structures or behavior of members. We know that individual 
organizations become ³µUHODWLRQDOO\¶DQGµSRVLWLRQDOO\¶HPEHGGHGLQ LQWHUILUPQHWZRUNVWKDWDIIHFW
WKHLU EHKDYLRU DQG SHUIRUPDQFH´ 5RZOH\ HW DO   +HQFH WKH VWUHQJWK RI mimetic 
pressures depends on elements of embeddedness such as: (i) the specific relations that 
organizations develop; (ii) the network sub-groups (cliques) they join, and (iii) the positions that 
they come to occupy within the overall network structure (=DKHHUDQG%HOO 
In summary, studies of network institutionalism (Ansell, 2008) emphasize network relations 
as: ³FKDQQHOVWKDWGLIIXVHO\DQGLPSHUIHFWO\GLUHFWWUDQVIHUVEHWZHHQQRGHVIDFLOLWDWLQJLQIRUPDWLRQ
VSLOORYHUVDQGRWKHUH[WHUQDOLWLHV´2ZHQ-6PLWKDQG3RZHOO(PSKDVLVDGGHG  :KDW
WKHVHVWXGLHVDUH yet to clarify are the mechanisms that sustain the spillover effects responsible for 
the reduction of organizational differences in ´VWUXFWXUH culture, and output" (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). This is necessary precisely because network affiliation is an outcome of individual 
partner selection decisions ± and not of normative or coercive pressures.  &RQVHTXHQWO\TXHVWLRQV
UHPDLQRSHQDERXWWKHIRUFHVWKDWERXQGVSLOORYHUHIIHFWVLQRUJDQL]DWLRQDOFRPPXQLWLHVDQGILHOGV
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DQGDERXWWKHOHYHODWZKLFKQHWZRUNHIIHFWVHIIHFWLYHO\RSHUDWH,QWKHQH[WVHFWLRQZHPDNHDILUVW
VWHSLQWKHGLUHFWLRQRIILOOLQJWKLVJDS 
 
+\SRWKHVHV 
$VZHKDYHGLVFXVVHGLQWKHSULRUVHFWLRQWKHRU\DQGDYDLODEOHHPSLULFDOVWXGLHVUHFRJQL]HWKDWWKH
SUHVHQFH RI QHWZRUN UHODWLRQV DUH V\VWHPDWLFDOO\ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WHQGHQFLHV WRZDUG PLPHWLF
LVRPRUSKLVP'L0DJJLR,QWKLVVWXG\ZHDUHLQWHUHVWHGLQDQDO\]LQJWKHUDQJHRIQHWZRUN
HIIHFWV RQ RUJDQL]DWLRQDO SHUIRUPDQFH LH LQ GHWHUPLQLQJ KRZ IDU QHWZRUN HIIHFWV VSLOO RXW :H
DGGUHVVWKLVLVVXHE\H[DPLQLQJWKHIDFWRUVWKDWDIIHFWLQWHURUJDQL]DWLRQDOSHUIRUPDQFHGLIIHUHQWLDOV
7KHFRQYHQWLRQDOH[SODQDWLRQLVWKDWFRQQHFWHGRUJDQL]DWLRQVWHQGWREHFRPHPRUHVLPLODUWRWKHLU
SDUWQHUV EHFDXVH GLUHFW FRQWDFW LQ WKH IRUP RI G\DGLF UHODWLRQV LQFUHDVHV PXWXDO DZDUHQHVV
IDFLOLWDWHVWKHWUDQVIHURINQRZOHGJHDFURVVRUJDQL]DWLRQDOERXQGDULHVDQGDFFHOHUDWHVWKHGLIIXVLRQ
RI RUJDQL]DWLRQDO SUDFWLFHV /DUVRQ  $OWHUQDWLYHO\ FRQQHFWHG RUJDQL]DWLRQV PD\ EHFRPH
PRUH VLPLODU WR WKHLU SDUWQHUV EHFDXVH WKH\ VKDUH PHPEHUVKLS LQ WKH VDPH QHWZRUN FOXVWHUV ± RU
FOLTXHV 5RZOH\ HW DO  )LQDOO\ RUJDQL]DWLRQV PD\ EHFRPH PRUH VLPLODU WR WKHLU SDUWQHUV
EHFDXVHWKH\IDFHVLPLODURSSRUWXQLWLHVDQGFRQVWUDLQWV LHEHFDXVHWKH\RFFXS\VLPLODUQHWZRUN
SRVLWLRQV 'L0DJJLR  (DFK RI WKHVH H[SODQDWLRQV LPSOLHV D GLIIHUHQW UDQJH IRU QHWZRUN
HIIHFWV YHU\ ORFDO LQ WKH ILUVW FDVH GLUHFW FRQWDFW DQG JOREDO LQ WKH WKLUG FDVH VWUXFWXUDO
HTXLYDOHQFH ZLWK FOLTXHV UHSUHVHQWLQJ DQ LQWHUPHGLDWH UDQJH RI LQIOXHQFH :H GLVFXVV WKHVH
SRVVLELOLWLHVLQWXUQ0L]UXFKLDQG0DUTXLV 
$YDLODEOHVWXGLHVLQVXSSRUWRIWKHGLUHFWFRQWDFWSHUVSHFWLYHVXVWDLQWKHDUJXPHQWWKDWGLUHFW
VRFLDO LQWHUDFWLRQPDNHVQHWZRUNSDUWQHUVPRUHVLPLODUDV³ILUPVZRXOGORRNWRWKHLUSHHUVZLWK
ZKRPWKH\VKDUHGVRFLDOWLHVDQGZRXOGEHLQIOXHQFHGE\WKHLUEHKDYLRU´0L]UXFKLDQG0DUTXLV
1HWZRUNWLHVWUDQVPLWLQIRUPDWLRQGLIIXVHNQRZOHGJHDQGWUDQVIHUPDWHULDOUHVRXUFHV
WKDW DUH OLNHO\ WR LQIOXHQFH LQGLYLGXDO EHKDYLRU LQ WKH GLUHFWLRQ RI PDNLQJ SDUWQHUV PRUH
KRPRJHQHRXVLQ WHUPVRIVWUXFWXUHVEHKDYLRUDORULHQWDWLRQDQGDUJXDEO\SHUIRUPDQFH%HFNPDQ
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DQG+DXQVFKLOG$KXMD'DYLVDQG*UHYH+HGVWURP6DQGHOODQG6WHUQ
7KHH[FKDQJHRIKLJK-TXDOLW\LQIRUPDWLRQDQGILQH-JUDLQHGNQRZOHGJHGHSHQGVRQWKHVWUHQJWKRI
LQWHUSHUVRQDO UHODWLRQVKLSV EHWZHHQ D NQRZOHGJH VRXUFH DQG D SRWHQWLDO UHFLSLHQW /DUVRQ 
6]XODQVNL8]]L$FFRUGLQJWRWKLVSHUVSHFWLYHZHVKRXOGH[SHFW WRREVHUYHVPDOOHU
SHUIRUPDQFH GLIIHUHQWLDOV DW D ORFDO PLFUR OHYHO RI DQDO\VLV 0L]UXFKL DQG 0DUTXLV 7KLV
YLHZLVVXPPDUL]HGLQWKHIROORZLQJK\SRWKHVLV 
 
+6WURQJHUGLUHFWUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQRUJDQL]DWLRQVZLOOEHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKVPDOOHUGLIIHUHQFHVLQ
WKHLUSHUIRUPDQFH 
 
7KLVSUHGLFWLRQ LV IXOO\DOLJQHGZLWK UHVXOWVRIHPSLULFDO VWXGLHV VKRZLQJ WKDW WKHVWUHQJWKRI WLHV
OLQNLQJWZRRUJDQL]DWLRQVHQFRXUDJHVFRPPXQLFDWLRQIDFLOLWDWHVLQIRUPDWLRQVKDULQJDQGpromotes 
³VRFLDO OHDUQLQJ RI DGDSWLYH UHVSRQVHV UDWKHU WKDQ RWKHU less productive, forms of inter-
organizational imitation.´.UDDW]$YDLODEOHUHVHDUFKKRZHYHUKDVQRWFRQVLGHUHGKRZ
WKHVH SRWHQWLDOO\ EHQHILFLDO HIIHFWV PD\ EH DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK D GHFUHDVHG GLIIHUHQFH LQ WKH
SHUIRUPDQFHRIFRQQHFWHGRUJDQL]DWLRQV 
7KHVWUHQJWKRIGLUHFW UHODWLRQVEHWZHHQSDUWQHURUJDQL]DWLRQV LV LPSRUWDQWEXW LW LVE\QR
PHDQV WKH RQO\ SRWHQWLDO VRXUFH RI LQIOXHQFH WKDW LQWHURUJDQL]DWLRQDO QHWZRUNV H[HUFLVH RQ
RUJDQL]DWLRQDO EHKDYLRU DQG SHUIRUPDQFH &RQVLGHUDEO\ OHVV XQGHUVWRRG DQG LQYHVWLJDWHG LV WKH
HIIHFW RI LQWHUPHGLDWH QHWZRUN VXEVWUXFWXUHV RQ RUJDQL]DWLRQDO SHUIRUPDQFH ± LH WKH HIIHFW RI
PHPEHUVKLSLQ³QHWZRUNVZLWKLQQHWZRUNV´RUFOLTXHV3URYDQDQG6HEDVWLDQ&OLTXHVPD\
EHYLHZHGDVUHODWLYHO\VWDEOHJURXSVRIRUJDQL]DWLRQVWKDWDUHPRUHGHQVHO\LQWHUFRQQHFWHGWRRQH
DQRWKHUWKDQWRRWKHURUJDQL]DWLRQVLQWKHQHWZRUN:DVVHUPDQDQG)DXVW 
0HPEHUVKLS LQFOLTXHV LV UDUHO\XQLTXHEHFDXVH LQWHURUJDQL]DWLRQDOQHWZRUNVDUH W\SLFDOO\
QRW GHFRPSRVDEOH V\VWHPV 6LPRQ  &RQVHTXHQWO\ RUJDQL]DWLRQV WHQG WR EH PHPEHUV RI
PXOWLSOH FOLTXHV ± DQ HPSLULFDO UHJXODULW\ WKDW KDV EHHQ IUHTXHQWO\ OLQNHG WR WKH ³VPDOO ZRUOG´
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FKDUDFWHU RI LQWHURUJDQL]DWLRQDO QHWZRUNV Baum, Shipilov and Rowley, 2003).  'XDOO\ FOLTXHV
RYHUODS ± RU ³LQWHUVHFW´ - WR WKH H[WHQW WKDW WKH\ DUH OLQNHG E\ FRPPRQ PHPEHUV %ODX DQG
6FKZDUW]>@%UHLJHU7KHPDLQSUHGLFWLRQLQWKLVFDVHLVWKDWRUJDQL]DWLRQVPD\
SHUIRUPVLPLODUO\WRWKHH[WHQWWKDWWKH\EHORQJWRoverlapping cliques because:³WKHRXWFRPHVIRU
ILUPV DUH IXQGDPHQWDOO\ LQWHUWZLQHG ZLWK WKRVH RI RWKHU ILUPV WKDW EHORQJ WR WKH VDPH FOLTXH´
5RZOH\HWDO'HQVHLQWHUFRQQHFWLRQVEHWZHHQPHPEHUVRIWKHVDPHFOLTXHVIDFLOLWDWH
WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI FRRSHUDWLYH QRUPV DQG WKH DGRSWLRQ RI VLPLODU EHKDYLRUV WKDW FRPH IURP
VDPSOLQJ WKHH[SHULHQFHIURPFRPPRQH[FKDQJHSDUWQHUV5RZOH\HWDO%HFDXVH FOLTXHV
DUHJHQHUDWHGE\QHWZRUNWLHVRUJDQL]DWLRQVEHLQJPHPEHUVRIDFOLTXHRUVKDULQJPHPEHUVKLSLQ
GLIIHUHQW FOLTXHV UHO\ RQ D VWURQJ HOHPHQW RI FRKHVLRQ WKDW HQKDQFHV RUJDQL]DWLRQDO OHDUQLQJ
UHFLSURFDODZDUHQHVVDQGNQRZOHGJHVKDULQJ7KLVLQWXUQLVOLNHO\WROHDGRUJDQL]DWLRQVWRDGRSW
VLPLODUEHKDYLRUVDQGDWWDLQVLPLODUOHYHOVRISHUIRUPDQFH5RZOH\HWDO$ORQJWKHVHOLQHV
FOLTXH FR-PHPEHUVKLS FDQ EH LQWHUSUHWHG DV DQ LQGLFDWRU RI VRFLDO SUR[LPLW\ GHWHUPLQHG E\
PHPEHUVKLS LQ LQWHUVHFWLQJ VRFLDO FLUFOHV GHILQHG DURXQG LQGLYLGXDO RUJDQL]DWLRQV $OED DQG
.DGXVKLQ 
7KLV YLHZ LV MXVWLILHG DOVR RQ PRUH JHQHUDO WKHRUHWLFDO JURXQGV $FFRUGLQJ WR %ODX DQG
6FKZDUW] IRU H[DPSOH >@ ³,QGLYLGXDOV DUH ORFDWHG DW WKH LQWHUVHFWLRQ RI QXPHURXV
VRFLDOFLUFOHVVRWKDWWKHLQJURXSPHPEHUVDORQJRQHGLPHQVLRQDUHQRWWKHVDPHDVWKHLULQJURXS
SDUWQHUV DORQJ RWKHU GLPHQVLRQV´ $V WKH LQWHUVHFWLRQ RYHUODS EHWZHHQ VRFLDO FLUFOHV FOLTXHV
LQFUHDVHV WKHYDULRXV³LQJURXSSDUWQHUV´ZLOO WHQG WRFRQYHUJH WRDXQLTXHVHW+HQFH WKHVRFLDO
SUR[LPLW\EHWZHHQRUJDQL]DWLRQVDOVR LQFUHDVHVGXH WR WKHIDFW WKDWRUJDQL]DWLRQVILQG WKHPVHOYHV
LQFUHDVLQJO\FRQQHFWHGWRWKHVDPHDOWHUVZKLFKWKH\UHSHDWHGO\HQFRXQWHULQGLIIHUHQWVHWWLQJV)RU
WKLV UHDVRQ ZH H[SHFW PLPHWLF IRUFHV WR RSHUDWH DW WKH PHVR OHYHO RI WKH ³QHWZRUNV ZLWKLQ
QHWZRUNV´GHILQHGE\PHPEHUVKLSLQPXOWLSOHFOLTXHV3URYDQDQG6HEDVWLDQ$FFRUGLQJWR
WKLV VHFRQG SHUVSHFWLYH ZH VKRXOG H[SHFW WR REVHUYH VPDOOHU SHUIRUPDQFH GLIIHUHQWLDOV EHWZHHQ
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RUJDQL]DWLRQV VKDULQJPHPEHUVKLS LQPXOWLSOH FOLTXHV7KLVYLHZ LV VXPPDUL]HG LQ WKH IROORZLQJ
K\SRWKHVLV 
 
+ +LJKHU GHJUHHV RI FOLTXH RYHUODS EHWZHHQ RUJDQL]DWLRQV ± LH VWURQJHU OHYHOV RI VRFLDO
SUR[LPLW\±ZLOOEHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKVPDOOHUGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHLUSHUIRUPDQFH 
 
7KLV SUHGLFWLRQ VHHPV WR EH MXVWLILHG DOVR LQ OLJKW RI VWXGLHV RQ KRZ WKH SHUIRUPDQFH-HQKDQFLQJ
HIIHFWV RI LQWHURUJDQL]DWLRQDO QHWZRUNV GHSHQG RQ LQWHJUDWLRQ ZLWKLQ PXOWLSOH VPDOO JURXSV RI
LQWHUDFWLQJSDUWQHUV3URYDQDQG6HEDVWLDQ$VLWLVFRPPRQH[WDQWUHVHDUFKIRFXVHVRQWKH
HIIHFWVRIQHWZRUNLQWHJUDWLRQRQLQGLYLGXDORUJDQL]DWLRQV%XWLWLVSUHFLVHO\WKLVLQWHJUDWLRQWKDWLV
EHKLQG WKH UHGXFWLRQ LQ SHUIRUPDQFH GLIIHUHQWLDOV WKDW ZH SUHGLFW WR EH DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK MRLQW
PHPEHUVKLSLQPXOWLSOHFOLTXHV 
$FFRUGLQJWRDWKLUGWKHRUHWLFDOYLVLRQQHWZRUNSRVLWLRQVWKDWRUJDQL]DWLRQVFRPHWRRFFXS\
± UDWKHU WKDQ GLUHFW VRFLDO LQWHUDFWLRQ RU VRFLDO SUR[LPLW\ ± DUH WKH PDLQ VRXUFH RI YDULDWLRQ LQ
RSSRUWXQLWLHVDQGFRQVWUDLQWVDQGKHQFH LQSHUIRUPDQFH %XUW7KLVYLVLRQ LVEDVHGRQ WKH
QRWLRQ RI VWUXFWXUDO HTXLYDOHQFH RU VLPLODULW\ LQ QHWZRUN SRVLWLRQV WKDW RUJDQL]DWLRQV FRPH WR
RFFXS\E\YLUWXHRIVLPLODULW\ LQ WKHLUSDWWHUQVRI UHODWLRQZLWK WKLUGSDUWLHV/RUUDLQHDQG:KLWH
 
6WUXFWXUDOO\HTXLYDOHQWRUJDQL]DWLRQVGHSHQGRQWKHVDPHUHVRXUFHVRUUHVRXUFHVFRQWUROOHG
E\ WKH VDPH DOWHUV DQG DUH WKHUHIRUH PRUH OLNHO\ WR FRPSHWH %XUW  0L]UXFKL 
&RPSHWLWLRQ LQGXFHG E\ VWUXFWXUDO HTXLYDOHQFH PD\ DOVR OHDG WR VLPLODULW\ LQ EHKDYLRU DQG
SHUIRUPDQFHEHFDXVHFRPSHWLWRUVDUHOLNHO\WRHPXODWHWKHDFWLRQVRIVXFFHVVIXORWKHUVSHUFHLYHGWR
EHLQDVLPLODUSRVLWLRQZLWKUHVSHFW WRIXQGDPHQWDOUHVRXUFHGHSHQGHQFLHV+DOOHQ=DKHHU
DQG%HOO 
2QHSRVVLEOHFRQVHTXHQFHRIVWUXFWXUDOHTXLYDOHQFHLVWKDWRUJDQL]DWLRQVMRLQWO\RFFXS\LQJD
VLPLODUQHWZRUNSRVLWLRQ±LQWKHOLPLWWKHVDPHQHWZRUNSRVLWLRQ±ZLOOIDFHVLPLODUFRQVWUDLQWVDQG
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RSSRUWXQLWLHVDQGZLOOEHWKHUHIRUHPRUHOLNHO\WRDWWDLQVLPLODUOHYHOVRISHUIRUPDQFH$FFRUGLQJ
WRWKLVYLHZZHVKRXOGH[SHFWWRREVHUYHVPDOOHUSHUIRUPDQFHGLIIHUHQWLDOVEHWZHHQRUJDQL]DWLRQV
WKDWGRQRWQHFHVVDULO\LQWHUDFWZLWKHDFKRWKHUEXWWKDWLQVWHDGVKDUHWKHVDPHSRVLWLRQZLWKLQWKH
JOREDOQHWZRUN%XUWDQG7DOPXGGHILQHRUJDQL]DWLRQDOQLFKHV±RUVXEVHWVRIRUJDQL]DWLRQV
WKDW ³VKDUH WKH VDPH IDWH´ +DQQDQ DQG )UHHPDQ  - DV VHWV RI VWUXFWXUDOO\ HTXLYDOHQW
RUJDQL]DWLRQV $FFRUGLQJ WR 'L0DJJLR¶V LQIOXHQWLDO VWDWHPHQW   (PSKDVLV RXUV
³6WUXFWXUDOHTXLYDOHQFHDQDO\VLV LVDNLQWRDQGLQIDFW WKHRUHWLFDOO\GHULYHGIURPUROHWKHRU\ ,WV
SUHPLVHLV WKDWRUJDQL]DWLRQVZLWKVLPLODUSDWWHUQVRIUHODWLRQVWRRWKHURUJDQL]DWLRQVZLOOEHFRPH
PRUH VLPLODU HYHQ LI WKH\ GR QRW LQWHUDFW ZLWK RQH DQRWKHU GLUHFWO\´ 7KLV YLHZ SURYLGHV WKH
WKHRUHWLFDO IRXQGDWLRQ IRU RXU SUHGLFWLRQ RI VLPLODULW\ LQ RUJDQL]DWLRQDO SHUIRUPDQFH DPRQJ
VWUXFWXUDOO\HTXLYDOHQWRUJDQL]DWLRQVVXPPDUL]HGLQWKHIROORZLQJK\SRWKHVLV 
 
+7KHPRUHVLPLODUDUHWKHQHWZRUNSRVLWLRQVWKDWWZRRUJDQL]DWLRQVRFFXS\WKHVPDOOHUZLOOEH
WKHLUGLIIHUHQFHLQSHUIRUPDQFH 
 
2XUWKLUGSUHGLFWLRQLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHUHVXOWVRIH[WHQVLYHUHVHDUFKVKRZLQJWKDWRUJDQL]DWLRQV
RFFXS\LQJ VLPLODU QHWZRUN SRVLWLRQV LH VWUXFWXUDOO\ HTXLYDOHQW RUJDQL]DWLRQV HQMR\ DQG IDFH
VLPLODURSSRUWXQLWLHVEHQHILWVDQGFRQVWUDLQWV (DiMaggio, 1986; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Burt, 
1982; Burt and Talmud, 1993)$VDFRQVHTXHQFHSHUIRUPDQFHLVXQOLNHO\WRYDU\ZLGHO\EHWZHHQ
RUJDQL]DWLRQV ZLWK VLPLODU ³SRVLWLRQDO HPEHGGHGQHVV´ SURILOHV ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV K\SRWKHVLV WKUHH
SUHGLFWV WKDW SHUIRUPDQFH LV PRUH OLNHO\ WR YDU\ EHWZHHQ UDWKHU WKDQ ZLWKLQ QHWZRUN SRVLWLRQV
3RZHOO.RSXWDQG6PLWK-'RHUU 
2XUGLVFXVVLRQVRIDUIRFXVHGRQLQWHURUJDQL]DWLRQDOSHUIRUPDQFHGLIIHUHQWLDOV±DQDWXUDOO\
G\DGLFFRQFHSW7KLV LV FRQVLVWHQWZLWK WKHZLGHO\KHOGYLHZ WKDW WKH FRQGLWLRQV IRU OHDUQLQJDQG
DVVLPLODWLRQ WHQG WRRSHUDWH DW WKH OHYHO RIG\DGLF UHODWLRQVEHWZHHQRUJDQL]DWLRQV *XODWL 
3RGROQ\  5LYHUD 6RGHVWURP DQG 8]]L  6WXDUW  DQG WKDW ILUP-OHYHO PRGHOV DUH
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LQDGHTXDWHWRFDSWXUHQHWZRUN-EDVHGSURFHVVHVEHFDXVHWKH\GRQRWWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWWKHLGHQWLWLHV
RIWKHSDUWQHUV6WXDUW8QOLNHWKHH[WHQVLYHOLWHUDWXUHEDVHGRQG\DGLFPRGHOVWKHODVWWZR
K\SRWKHVHVVXJJHVWWKDWG\DGLFYDULDWLRQPD\EHH[SODLQHGE\IDFWRUVGHILQHGDWGLIIHUHQWKLJKHU
OHYHOV RI DQDO\VLV 0DQ\ RI WKH HPSLULFDO VWXGLHV FXUUHQWO\ DYDLODEOH IRFXV RQO\ RQ RQH OHYHO RI
DQDO\VLV ZKLOH LJQRULQJ HIIHFWV SRWHQWLDOO\ RSHUDWLQJ DW GLIIHUHQW OHYHOV *DODVNLHZLF] DQG %XUW
5RZOH\HW DO+DOOHQ:LWKIHZQRWDEOHH[FHSWLRQV %XUW)HUOLHHW DO
 0L]UXFKL DQG 0DUTXLV  VWXGLHV KDYH QRW VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ FRQVLGHUHG WKH LQIOXHQFH
HIIHFW RI PLFUR PHVR DQG PDFUR OHYHOV RI DQDO\VLV RQ SHUIRUPDQFH GLIIHUHQWLDOV EHWZHHQ
RUJDQL]DWLRQV 7KLV LV ZKDW ZH GR LQ WKH HPSLULFDO SDUW RI WKH SDSHU E\ H[DPLQLQJ KRZ
LQWHURUJDQL]DWLRQDOSHHUHIIHFWVGHILQHGDWWKHVWULFWO\ORFDOLQWHUPHGLDWHDQGJOREDOQHWZRUNOHYHOV
DIIHFWSHUIRUPDQFHGLIIHUHQWLDOVDPRQJPHPEHUVRILQWHURUJDQL]DWLRQDOQHWZRUNV 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND MODELS 
3.1 Empirical Setting and Sample  
The opportunity to put our general arguments in empirical context is provided by data that we have 
collected on a community of hospital organizations providing health care coverage to Lazio - one 
of the largest Italian regions with a population of approximately 5,700,000 inhabitants. +RVSLWDO
RUJDQL]DWLRQV SURYLGH DQ DOPRVW LGHDO HPSLULFDO VHWWLQJ IRU VWXG\LQJ SURFHVVHV RI PLPHWLF
LVRPRUSKLVPEHFDXVH±DVFennell (1980: 505) put it³+RVSLWDOV«ZLOOEHGHILQHGDVILWRQO\LI
they can offer everything other KRVSLWDOV LQ WKHDUHDRIIHU´ $OVR FLWHG LQ'L0DJJLR DQG3RZHOO
1983: 154). This known tendency of hospitals (as highly institutionalized professional 
organizations) toward mimetic isomorphism is strengthened when through patient transfer relations 
hospitals have a direct opportunity to learn the organizational and clinical practices enacted by 
partners. We focus on patient transfer because research has shown that this specific relation cannot 
exist without intense mutual communication and sharing of information on internal clinical 
practices (Iwashyna, 2012; Iwashyna et al., 2009; Lomi et al., 2014). The field of health care 
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provides an ideal setting to conduct our analysis also because hospital performance is well-
documented, and allows direct interorganizational comparison. Rich sources of high quality 
information are also available and publicly accessible on patterns of interorganizational 
collaboration ± as we define it below. 
Health care in Italy is organized on a regional basis according to federal principles. Thus, 
the regional health system in Lazio is part of the Italian National Health Service (INHS), a publicly 
funded health care system providing universal coverage free of charge at the point of service. The 
health system in Lazio is partitioned into twelve Local Health Units (LHUs). LHUs are vertically 
integrated public organizations funded by the region through a capitated budget and responsible for 
the provision of a wide range of services in geographical areas with target populations of 
approximately 500,000. LHUs represent the reference markets from which hospitals derive basic 
input resources ± namely, patients and budgetary funds ± and to which hospitals sell their services. 
The majority of hospitals in Italy are publicly owned, but a significant number of investor-owned, 
and not-for-profit hospitals also receive public funding through a contracting system with the 
INHS. Both public and private hospitals in Lazio enjoy high levels of administrative and 
managerial autonomy in the organization and delivery of health care services. Hospitals are 
accountable to regional health authorities for performance results and use of resources within the 
limits of global budgets yearly assigned to them. 
Because they operate in a sector that is jointly technical and institutional (Scott and Meyer, 
1983), hospitals represent an almost ideal example of organizations whose performance, status, and 
social legitimacy depend on their ability to involve partners in joint problem solving activities in 
WKHLQWHUHVWRISDWLHQWV¶KHDOWK,ZDVK\QDHWDO3URYDQDQG0LOZDUG)RUWKLVUHDVRQ
the ability to access knowledge resources across organizational boundaries and to involve partners 
in joint problem-solving activities and arrangements is particularly important for hospital 
organizations. One way in which two hospitals may be involved in joint problem solving activities 
LVWKURXJKGLUHFWSDWLHQWWUDQVIHUVZKHUHE\LQSDWLHQWVGLVFKDUJHGIURPRQH³VHQGHU´KRVSLWDODUH
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DGPLWWHG WR DQRWKHU ³UHFHLYHU´ KRVSLWDO 3DWLHQW WUDQVIHU LV RQH RI WKH PRVW LPSRUWDQW IRUPV RI
inter-hospital collaboration that has been only recently investigated in the health care literature on 
interorganizational networks (Lee et al., 2011; Iwashyna and Courey, 2011; Lomi and Pallotti, 
2012).  
The intended objective of patient transfers is to serve the best interest of patients: In most 
cases transfers occur when a hospital has limited physical capacity available, or patients with 
complex pathologies for which no adequate technologies or clinical competences are available, or 
when a hospital has patients with therapeutic needs that may be met more effectively in another 
hospital. In all these cases, the choice of destination for the patient involves an explicit partner 
selection decision: A sender hospital may choose from a number of recipient hospitals for the same 
patient. Discretionary patient transfers also represent important opportunities of reciprocal learning, 
as they imply intense collaboration and coordination between partners involved in the transfer. This 
coordination involves transfer of clinical information (carried by documentation accompanying 
patients being transferred), as well as transfer of knowledge about clinical and organizational 
practices of the partner hospital. These are rather specific information, because they concern the 
clinical and organizational history of the patients being transferred. Completing a transfer requires 
not only a physical and technical infrastructure making the transfer operationally possible 
(Iwashyna, 2012), but also a relational infrastructure based on a complex coordination and 
information sharing process between partner hospitals (Gittel, 2002; Bosk, Veinot, and Iwashyna 
2011).    
We interpret ties established between hospitals through patient transfers as proxies for the 
underlying propensity of hospitals to collaborate and learn from others (Lee et al., 2011; Veinot et 
al., 2012; Iwashyna and Courey, 2011). As one of the medical directors of a large university 
hospital reported in an interview: ³3DWLHQW WUDQVIHUV DUH PDGH SRVVLEOH RQO\ ZLWK KLJK OHYHOV RI
FRRUGLQDWLRQ DQG FRPPXQLFDWLRQ EHWZHHQ SDUWQHU KRVSLWDOV´ Lack of adequate coordination 
between hospitals involved in patient transfers has predictable adverse consequences (Lee et al., 
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2011). Inter-hospital patient transfers represent also an opportunity for partner hospitals to learn 
from others and acquire new competencies. For example, the medical staff of the receiving hospital 
might learn from receiving a patient that underwent an innovative procedure or treatment protocol 
in the sending hospital. The director of a clinical ward in one of the hospitals in our sample 
revealed that: ³7UDQVIHUULQJSDWLHQWV LVDQ LPSRUWDQW OHDUQLng experience. Preparing the records 
that accompany the patient is an extremely delicate and important activity. The doctors who 
complete and sign the documents put a lot of effort into it. Sometimes they do it to impress the 
receiving hospital. These documents often contain hundreds of pages (containing information on 
UHIHUUDOVGLDJQRVWLFWHVWVHWF´ 
Our analysis relies on both primary and secondary data sources. We obtained secondary 
data from archival sources contained in the Regional Hospital Information System database (SIO) 
which provides information on patients admitted by any hospital in the region. We supplemented 
official sources with a questionnaire-based survey, administered to all the hospitals in Lazio and 
designed to collect information on a number of dimensions of organizational structures, resources 
and hospital activities. We also conducted semi-structured interviews with hospital doctors, 
managers and executives to improve our contextual understanding of inter-hospital collaboration 
via patient transfers among hospital organizations. Our final sample includes 91 hospitals ± 
corresponding to 8,190 dyadic observations which we analyze in the empirical part of the study. 
 
3.2 Variables and Measures 
Dependent variable 
The main dependent variable of our study is based on a specific aspect of organizational 
performance. Almost regardless of the kind of organization, performance is a multidimensional 
concept that is difficult or undesirable to reduce to a unique measure (Barney, 2002). This is 
particularly the case for hospitals, organizations for which legitimacy, institutional standing and, 
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ultimately, performance depend on their ability to satisfy expectations expressed by a variety of 
external stakeholders (Ruef and Scott, 1998). 
For the purpose of this study we focus on a general measure of organizational performance 
that has been widely used in the Italian health care industry in recent years: the Comparative 
Performance Index (CPI). Among available performance indices, the CPI captures both technical 
and social dimensions of organizational performance because it takes into account operational 
aspects of the supply of health care services, and because it is explicitly comparative. Thus, the CPI 
is an ideal measure as it provides information that can be used by a variety of stakeholders to assess 
KRVSLWDOV¶SHUIRUPDQFH,WLVXVHGE\KHDOWKDXWKRULWLHVDV&3,DOORZVFRPSDULQJWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVV
of a hospital relative to that of a standard set of hospitals at a regional level. Health care authorities 
use the CPI for budget allocation purposes, and hence is a measure whose variation tends to attract 
management attention. The CPI index is also used by hospital managers to evaluate the position of 
a hospital in the reference market for health care services, as the CPI varies with the 
competitiveness of hospitals considered as benchmark.  
Following the definition of the Italian Ministry of Health, the CPI is a composite index that 
measures the effectiveness ± in terms of length of stay ± of a hospital relative to the average 
effectiveness of a reference set of hospitals (typically, at regional level) with an analogous 
composition of cases treated, where cases are categorized into Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs). 
CPI is computed as:    
 
> @ > @¦¦
  
 
n
i
ii
n
i
iij NDNdCPI
c
11
*/*                  (1) 
 
Where id  indicates the average length of stay of DRGi numbered in hospital j; iD  indicates the 
average length of stay of DRGi numbered in the reference set of hospitals with an analogous 
composition of cases treated; iN  indicates the number of discharges of DRGi numbered in the 
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reference set of hospitals; n indicates the number of DRGs in the reference set of hospitals, and nc 
indicates the number of common DRG overlapping between hospital j and the reference set of 
hospitals (Gianino et al. 2006). The CPI takes the value of 1.0 for hospitals whose performance is 
aligned with the performance of the reference set of hospitals. The CPI takes values that are smaller 
(larger) than 1.0 for hospitals that perform better (worse) than the regional standard. Finally, we 
note that the CPI is a particularly useful measure of hospital performance for at least two reasons. 
The first is substantive. By keeping the case mix into account, the CPI allows comparison of 
hospitals that would be otherwise too different to compare. The second is institutional. The CPI is 
used by public health authorities explicitly to compare different hospitals and to link resource 
incentives to clear performance targets.  
We study how interorganizational differences in performance vary with three main 
independent variables of interest: (i) strength of direct social interaction; (ii) social proximity as 
measured by co-membership in cliques, and (iii) structural equivalence, or positional similarity in 
the relevant interorganizational network. More precisely, we compute the difference between the 
best performer and the worst performer within each organizational dyad. In this way we can test 
our performance assimilation hypotheses while at the same time have a sense of the directionality 
of the effect. If the effect of a covariate is to reduce the difference in performance between the 
members of a dyad, WKHQ LW PHDQV WKDW DVVLPLODWLRQ KDSSHQV ³IURP EHORZ´ ± i.e., the worse 
performing tends to approach the better performing partner. In this case, the performance spillover 
effect would be positive as we can detect directional performance assimilation effects. 
Less informally, suppose that SL and Sj are the levels of performance attained by 
organization i and j, respectively. Suppose, further, that S* = max (Si, Sj) is the best level of 
performance observed within the ij-th dyad. Then the average difference in performance within a 
dyad is: 'Sij ½>SSiSSj@ When i is the best performer (i.e., S Si), then 
'SLM ½SSj). When j is the best performer (i.e., S Sj), then 'SLM ½SSi). In either 
case, a decrease in 'Sijimplies not only that i and j are becoming more similar, but also that 
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DVVLPLODWLRQKDSSHQV³IURPEHORZ´LHWKHORZSHUIRUPLQJPHPEHURIWKHG\DGLVGUDZQWRZDUG
the higher level of performance of the partner (i.e, either Si!SorSj!S). A symmetric 
argument holds if 'Sijincreases. In this case, the performance of partners diverges as partnership 
accentuates differences in performance between members of the dyad.       
 
Independent variables 
We use information on the network of inter-hospital patient transfers to compute the three main 
independent variables of interest. More precisely, by using public data on inter-hospital patient 
flows, we constructed an asymmetric matrix (V=[vij]) of size 91x91. The matrix contains in rows 
(columns) the hospitals sending (receiving) patients, and in intersection cells (vij) the number of 
patients transferred from the row hospital i to the column hospital j. This corresponds to 8,190 
dyads of sending/receiving hospitals (that is n(n - 1), where n = 91). The volume of transferred 
patients within dyads ranges from 0 to 525 patients, with an average of 1.6 (standard deviation = 
12.69). An illustrative graphical representation of this network is provided in Figure 1.  
 
- Insert Figure 1 about here ± 
 
The independent variables of theoretical interest are based on different aspects of the collaborative 
relationship observed between hospitals. As we discuss and show in the remainder of this section 
the independent variables of theoretical interest are not different measures of the same 
phenomenon, but measures of the different phenomena underlying our hypotheses.  
We measure the strength of direct social interaction by using the volume of patient transfers 
between hospitals, because the number of patients transferred between partner hospitals is a reliable 
proxy for the intensity of collaboration via resource exchange (Gittell, 2002)1.  
                                                          
1
 To rule out the possibility that our results are affected by the tendency of larger hospitals to send and receive 
more patients than smaller hospitals, we also used an alternative measure of the strength of interaction. More 
precisely, we scaled the number of patient transfers by the number of admitted patients for each hospital and 
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Proximity in social groups is measured by using joint membership in organizational sub-
groups, or cliques. In network terms, cliques are defined as maximally complete sub-sets of actors 
with three or more members (Wasserman and Faust, 1994)2. Because clique membership is a 
discrete concept, to compute co-membership in cliques we first binarized the original (valued) 
inter-hospital patient transfer matrix and then found all the possible cliques in the network.3 Co-
membership was then computed by simply counting the number of cliques in which any two 
hospitals in the sample are jointly members.  
We rely on the notion of clique co-PHPEHUVKLSWRPHDVXUHVRFLDOSUR[LPLW\EHFDXVH´In a 
clique, the outcomes for firms are fundamentally intertwined with those of other firms that belong 
WRWKHVDPHFOLTXH´5RZOH\HWDO%HKDYLRURIRUJDQL]DWLRQVHQFRXQWHULQJHDFKRWKHU
in multiple cliques will be more likely to be interdependent because of the increased level of mutual 
awareness inherent in the co-membership in multiple cliques, and because of the dependence on 
common sources of information represented by multiple shared partners.  
Finally, to measure positional similarity we rely on the original insight of White, Boorman 
and Breiger (1976), and follow a strategy that is frequently adopted in the blockmodel analysis of 
interorganizational fields (DiMaggio, 1986). As a continuous measure of positional similarity we 
use the correlation of the rows and columns of the inter-hospital patient transfer network, a widely 
accepted measure of similarity in the relational profiles of the organizations in the network 4. The 
result is a matrix S of correlation coefficients in which the value of the cells (sij) varies between -1 
and +1. The closer sij is to +1, the more i and j have similar relational profiles, i.e. - in the language 
of social network analysis ± the more they are structurally equivalent.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
included this new variable in our empirical model specification. By all practical purposes, the results obtained 
by using this normalization are the same as those reported in the paper. 
2
 This is the most restrictive and mathematically defensible clique structure. It requires that all members of the 
subgroup are tied to every other member such that the maximal social distance between all pairs is one. This 
definition maps on precisely to the definition of cliques as maximally complete sub-graphs. 
3
 We dichotomized the patient transfer matrix by setting all the non-negative entries in the weighted adjacency 
matrix equal to one. Note that the average cell value is below 2 (See Table 1). Hence, different dichotomization 
rules (for example based on the mean cell value) would produce almost identical network structures.  
4
 The relational profile similarity measures that we compute is identical to the initial matrix of correlation 
produced by CONCOR, a widely used algorithm used to partition social networks into structurally equivalent 
sets of nodes (Arabie, Boorman, and Levitt, 1978). We do not use CONCOR because we are interested in a 
continuous measure of similarity in network positions rather than in a discrete partition.  
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Control variables 
Variation in interorganizational performance cannot obviously be explained only by network-
related effects at the dyad, clique, and global network levels. We control for the effects of two 
broad categories of factors that may influence organizational performance and, therefore, confound 
the relation between network effects and performance similarity between organizations. The first 
category involves organization-specific covariates such as size (number of beds and number of 
discharges), technological endowments (technology), managerial orientation (administrative 
intensity), capacity utilization (occupancy rate), task complexity (complex DRG), service mix 
(number of specialties), and type of assistance (level of care). Within this first group of covariates, 
Complex DRG is likely to play a particularly important role in our analysis because it captures 
salient operational, clinical and economic differences between hospitals (Lynk, 2001).  The second 
category of covariates includes broader institutional and competitive forces. We control for the 
former by including a variable that is equal to 1 if sender and receiver hospitals belong to the same 
institutional category (referring to the classification used by the health authorities), as well as joint 
membership in Local Health Units (LHU membership). We capture the latter by measuring the 
extent of competitive interdependence between pairs of hospitals in terms of number of patients 
they treat who come from the same administrative areas, or LHUs (Sohn, 2001; 2002); we also 
control for geographic distance between each pair of hospitals.  
Table 1 summarizes essential information on the variables included in our empirical model 
specifications. Some variables are defined at the organizational level (i.e., monadic variables) while 
others refer to hospital dyads (i.e., dyadic variables). Values for the dependent variable (CPI) are 
computed for year 2004, while values of all the other variables are computed for year 2003. 
- Insert Table 1 about here ± 
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Table 2 reports correlation coefficients among all the variables included in our empirical model 
specifications. 
- Insert Table 2 about here ± 
 
The descriptive figures reported in Table 2 help us to clarify a point that may be of potential 
empirical and conceptual concern. The three variables of main theoretical interest (variable 2: 
Strength of social interaction; variable 3: Social proximity, and variable 4: Positional similarity) are 
only weakly correlated. This means that ± empirically ± the three variables vary with at least some 
degree of independence. This is important because a high correlation might make it difficult to 
identify individual effects. In our sample, the weak correlation (0.065) between strength of social 
interaction and positional similarity simply reveals that organizations occupying the same network 
position (structurally equivalent organizations) are not necessarily directly connected (DiMaggio, 
1986). This descriptive result is consistent with prior research demonstrating that strength of social 
interaction (or ³FRKHVLRQ´) and positional similarity (or ³VWUXFWXUDO HTXLYDOHQFH´) are distinct 
theoretical and analytical constructs (Burt, 1978). The relatively weak correlation (0.183) between 
strength of social interaction and social proximity reveals that organizations linked by strong ties 
belong to cliques that do not necessarily contain the same members. Finally, the correlation 
between social proximity and positional similarity (0.138) is relatively weak because ± while 
cliques may be considered as a special kind of jointly occupied network position (Burt, 1978: 189), 
they assume a direct connection among all the members of the cliques. Clearly, in our data 
structurally equivalent organizations are not all directly connected, i.e., are not members of cliques. 
 
3.3 Empirical Model Specification 
The outcome of interest in this study is similarity in performance between organizations. As a 
consequence, the most appropriate unit of analysis is the individual dyad (Mizruchi and Marquis, 
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2006). The dyad is the smallest possible unit at which similarities and differences due to 
collaboration or other social processes can be detected. 
Given the dyadic structure of the data and the continuous nature of our dependent variable, 
we report results based on estimates of the parameters in models based on a fixed-effects regression 
structure. This is the generally accepted modeling practice to control for lack of independence 
among the dyads in dyadic models (Mizruchi, 1989; Stuart, 1988). The basic model considered 
here is: 
 
  ijiijijijijij XSPTYE HKGTJED  )(
                                                       
(2) 
 
where 
ij
Y  is a vector reporting observed differences in performance as discussed above (CPI 
differences) among each and every organization in the sample such that 
ij
Y  = 'Sijas defined 
above; ijT  is the strength of direct social interaction or the number of patients that hospital i 
transfers to hospital j; ijP
 
indicates social proximity, or the number of cliques that hospital i shares 
with hospital j as defined by the adjacency matrix of overlapping cliques; 
ij
S
 
indicates the degree 
of positional similarity (structural equivalence) between hospital i and hospital j; 
ij
X  summarizes 
the effect of covariates included to control for organizational and institutional variables; and 
i
K  is a 
set of organization-specific fixed effects. Finally, 
ij
H  is an error term assumed to follow a normal 
distribution with zero mean. For benchmarking purposes, we test (2) against a restricted version (3) 
in which we assume ȕ = Ȗ = ș = 0, that is, network effects are irrelevant at all levels:  
 
  ijiijij XYE HKGD  )(
              
(3) 
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Organizations may not react to interorganizational peer effects only by becoming more similar to 
their (i) associates; (ii) clique co-members and (iii) structurally equivalent others. It is possible that 
when the intensity of peer pressure reaches very high levels, organizations may find it useful to 
implement differentiation strategies (Deephouse, 1999). To account for this possibility, and as a 
robustness check, we also fit a second-order polynomial regression in which the key predictors ijT , 
ijP , and ijS  are raised to the power of 2. Equation 2 then becomes:  
 
  ijiijijijijijijijij XSSPPTTYE HKGTTJJEED  221221221)(                  (4) 
 
Because our data are dyadic, covariates representing continuous organizational variables enter the 
model specification as absolute differences between levels of the variable observed for ³VHQGHU´ i 
DQG ³UHFHLYHU´ j hospitals. The smaller this difference, the more similar are the hospitals with 
respect to the specific attribute that is being considered. For covariates taking on categorical and 
binary values we compute an exact match indicator to identify organizations belonging to the same 
category.  
We use a fixed-effects approach to address a major concern with dyad-oriented observation 
schemes: the observations are not independent because each actor in the network appears in 
multiple dyads, creating complex dependencies across observations (Stuart, 1998). Because of the 
presence of complex dependence structures, coefficient estimates will be consistent, but the 
standard errors may be estimated incorrectly. In empirical studies of organizational networks this 
problem is typically alleviated by introducing a fixed effect for each source or recipient of a 
relationship, by clustering the standard errors at the sender level and applying the Hubert-White 
correction for heteroskedasticity (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Reagans and McEvily, 2003; 
White, 1980). We adopt the same analytical strategy, which also serves as a control for additional 
sources of unobserved heterogeneity across hospitals. 
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3.4 Model estimation 
The results that we discuss in the next section (reported in Table 3, see below) are obtained by 
estimating a fixed-effects (FE) regression with robust standard errors, using specification (4) above, 
that is, including both linear and quadratic terms for the network factors (model specification Q, 
³4XDGUDWLF´. For comparison purposes, we also considered equation (2) PRGHO/³/LQHDU´and 
its restricted version (3) (PRGHO( ³(PSW\´which does not include network effects) as possible 
alternative specifications. Statistical tests (Wald tests) rejected the hypothesis that the linear 
network effects (strength of direct relations, co-membership in cliques, network positions) are 
jointly insignificant, and similarly, that the quadratic terms of these same network variables are 
jointly insignificant, thereby leading to the conclusion that equation (2) (Model L) is to be preferred 
to (3) (Model E), and (4) (Model Q) to (2) (Model L). 
Following standard econometric practice, we also considered alternative approaches, 
notably pooled OLS and random-effects (RE) estimations5. Model specification tests provided 
evidence that, due to heteroskedasticity in the errors from the regressions, pooled OLS performs 
less well than either RE or FE. In turn, the choice of the FE estimator against RE, is due to rejection 
of the over-identifying restrictions involved in the RE approach. Indeed both FE and RE estimators 
assume that the regressors are uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error, but the latter also require  
organization-specific effects to be orthogonal to other regressors, an assumption that turns out to be 
excessively strong for our data. For these reasons, we conclude that the FE estimator is to be 
preferred, although for all three specifications, coefficients are highly similar across RE and FE in 
terms of their sign, size, and significance. 
 
4. ANALYSIS 
4.1. Results 
                                                          
5
 The results of pooled OLS and random effects were included in an earlier version of the paper and 
are available from the Authors upon request. 
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Because the effects we report are stable across specifications, we organize the discussion of the 
results around the full model (Model Q) in Table 3 reporting the fixed-effects estimates of models 
in which the dependent variable is the absolute difference between the best and worst performer 
within each dyad. As we explained, performance is measured in terms of the Comparative 
Performance Index, CPI ± a widely used and generally accepted measure of hospital performance. 
 
- Insert Table 3 about here - 
 
Because we are estimating the effect of each variable on the gap in performance between (sending) 
hospital i and (receiving) hospital j, a negative coefficient indicates that an increase in the 
independent variable will lead to a reduction of this gap, that is, to more similar levels of 
performance as measured by the CPI indicator. It bears repeating here that a negative effect also 
implies ± by construction - that the reduction in performance difference within each dyad happens 
³IURPEHORZ´ LH WKURXJKDQ LQFUHDVH LQ WKHSHUIRUPDQFHRI WKH worse performing organization 
which tends to assimilate the performance of its better performing partner.  
Concerning our variables of theoretical interest, we find that the strength of direct social 
interaction, measured by the number of patient transfers ijT , has no discernible effect on 
performance differences: bilateral exchanges, however numerous and frequent, are insufficient to 
generate spillover effects that affect similarity in hospitals' CPI. One possible interpretation of this 
result is that individual ties are relatively unimportant when not considered as embedded in more 
complex network structures (Uzzi, 1996). In other words, individual ties that are not part of more 
complex dependence structures are unlikely to affect performance differentials. 
Instead, co-membership in network subgroups ijP  is highly significant in all models, and its 
quadratic effect is also significant, though both are small in size. The negative sign of the linear 
effect indicates that greater social proximity as measured by greater embeddedness in common 
cliques leads to more similar performance, while the positive effect of the quadratic term indicates 
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that the relationship is convex. A minimum is attained when  ijP
 
=  )000098.02
003565.0(   = 18.19, a 
value located at about the midpoint of the range over which social proximity is defined (0-37: see 
Table 1). Beyond this level, further increases in the number of shared cliques will increase the gap 
in performance between sender and receiver. In other words, the assimilation effects of social 
proximity reach a limit when the number of cliques in which two organizations share membership 
is approximately 18. After this limit is reached, the countering effects of over-embeddedness sets 
in, and the performance of organizational partners begin to diverge (Figure 2, left panel). In other 
words, over-embeddedness triggers differentiation which, in turn, might produce differences in 
SHUIRUPDQFH7KLVPD\EHWKHFDVHEHFDXVH³RYHU-HPEHGGHGQHVV´LVNQRZQWREHDVVRFLDWHGZLWK
decline in performance (Uzzi, 1997). An alternative conjecture could be that over-embeddedness 
stimulates the formation of weak ties in an attempt to sample the experience of distant and hence 
less familiar others (Baum et al., 2005).  
Finally, we find that positional similarity has a linear negative effect, so that a unit increase 
in it will reduce the gap in performance between i and j by approximately 2.6% (Figure 2, right 
panel). In other words, similarity in the relational profiles of two organizations (their structural 
equivalence) makes them more similar in terms of their performance. 
  
- Insert Figure 2 about here - 
 
Regarding the control variables, we find that parameter estimates have intuitively predictable signs. 
%HFDXVH ³VL]H´ of a hospital is a complex concept that can be measured in different ways, we 
included two variables that capture different aspects of the size of a hospital. More specifically, 
number of staffed beds captures the aspect of capacity installed, whereas number of discharges 
ZKLFKLVHTXDOWRWKHQXPEHURIDGPLWWHGSDWLHQWVFDSWXUHVWKHWKURXJKSXWDVSHFWRIDKRVSLWDO¶V
dimension. The results show that in both cases differences in organizational size do not affect 
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differences in performance, nor do differences in technology endowments and level of care. 
Differences in the number of specialties have only a weak negative effect when network effects are 
introduced in specifications (L) and (Q), indicating that hospitals with a large number of specialties 
and hospitals with a small number of specialties do not differ in terms of performance. All the rest 
being equal, differences in administrative intensity, or percentage of managerial staff on total 
workforce, have a positive effect, corresponding to larger performance gaps between sender and 
receiver hospitals, though this result is only significant at the 5% level. Differences in occupancy 
rates also have a strong and positive effect on CPI gaps, suggesting that hospitals using their 
available beds capacity to very different degrees will have very different performance. Likewise, 
differences in the extent to which hospitals handle complex cases also result in very different 
performance outcomes. As we expected, the effect of complexity (or the proportion of complex 
DRGs over the total amount of DRGs) is particularly strong. Complex DRG is typically used to 
LQGLFDWH SDWLHQW FRQGLWLRQV WKDW DUH QRW DFFRXQWHG IRU E\ SDWLHQWV¶ '5* FODVVLILFDWLRQV DQG WKDW
result in higher clinical variation and financial risks for hospitals dealing with these cases (Slattery 
and Harewood, 2012; Tahari et al., 2001). This result may be taken as evidence of the fact that the 
economics of hospitals dealing with cases that are administratively more complex is quite different 
from that of simpler hospitals (Lynk, 2001). 
Geographical distance has a strong negative effect, meaning that hospitals located close to 
each other do not tend to attain similar levels of performance that are reached, instead, by those 
located further apart. Joint LHU membership has no significant effect on differences in 
organizational performance. The effect of competitive interdependence is negative and significant, 
indicating a strong effect on the reduction of performance differentials of competitive constraints 
and therefore, dependency on common resources (patients, in our case). Greater competitive 
interdependence corresponds to greater performance similarity ± a result aligned with our 
understanding of how economic competition shapes the world of organizations. Finally, 
institutional type is only slightly significant under the empty model (E), but loses its significance 
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when network effects are introduced in specifications (L) and (Q). Therefore, similarity in 
institutional form does not significantly affect differences in performance.   
We have repeated the same analysis after standardizing the covariates to learn if there were 
significant differences in the magnitude of the estimated parameters (results not reported here). 
With the partial exception of the effect of complex DRG, the magnitude of the estimated effects 
associated with the covariates of theoretical interest are comparable with the magnitude of the 
effects of the other control covariates included in the model and, in fact, they are frequently 
stronger. For example, in the standardized model social proximity is more than two times stronger 
as the effect of organizational size (measured in terms of number of beds and number of discharged 
patients) ± one of the variables that is typically associated with powerful differences between 
organizations (Blau, 1970; Kalleberg and van Buren, 1996). In the standardized model not reported 
here, the effects of structural equivalence are approximately 4 times larger than the effect of LHU 
membership - perhaps the most powerful source of institutional isomorphism in the 
interorganizational field under investigation.   
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
A central insight produced by studies of interorganizational networks is that organizational 
structures, behaviors and performance are all shaped by social connections that organizations 
develop and by positions that they occupy in networks of exchange relations (Mizruchi and 
Marquis, 2006). A second important insight from institutional theories is that interdependent 
organizations tend to assimilate each other knowledge and emulate each other behavior, hence 
becoming more similar in terms of structures, behavioral orientations and, ultimately, outcomes. 
This is the essence of mimetic isomorphism ± the tendency of organizations to conform to network 
partners so clearly identified by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). In the case of mimetic isomorphism 
the tendency of organizations to become similar is not produced by state regulation (coercive 
isomorphism) or by the diffusion of institutional norms (normative isomorphism), but by the active 
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adoption of practices that are expected to be beneficial. What we have added in this paper is detail 
on the possible mechanisms underlying mimetic isomorphism and about the level at which these 
mechanism effectively operate.  
,QWKHFXUUHQWVWXG\ZHFRPELQHGWKHVHWZRPDMRULQVLJKWVLQWRD³QHWZRUNLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP´
IUDPHZRUNWKDW³Emphasizes relationships - which are not reducible to individual attributes - as the 
EDVLFXQLWRIH[SODQDWLRQ´Ansell, 2008: 76). We adopted this framework to develop the claim that 
if the effects of network influence on organizational performance exist, then the difference between 
the performances of interdependent organizations should be smaller than if there were no influence. 
We then asked: To what extent and at what level of analysis are organizations actually affected by 
the performance of their network peers? This question corresponds to asking how far influence 
effects that operate through networks spill over. Possible answers to this question involve explicit 
assumptions about the level at which networks exert their influence on organizational performance 
and about the mechanisms that swathe such influence. We address this general question in a 
specific empirical context using data that we have collected on performance and exchange relations 
between hospital organizations.  
We found that performance spillover effects are highly differentiated and vary significantly 
across network levels. More specifically, we found that the strength of direct social interaction is 
not significantly associated with performance spillover effects between connected organizations: 
interorganizational performance differentials are not necessarily reduced by the strength of direct 
collaborative relationships between partners. We believe that the fact that direct dyadic dependence 
generated by network ties does not seem to explain dyadic differences is a new result that opens 
new directions for future research about the level at which network effects operate.    
Joint membership in cliques, on the other hand, has a clear non-linear effect on performance 
spillover: as social proximity increases interorganizational performance differentials decrease a t 
first, then reach a minimum beyond which further increases in social proximity are accompanied by 
an increase in performance differentials. This is the case because simultaneous membership in 
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multiple cliques exposes organizations to common sources of influence and helps them to form a 
frame of comparability within which they are better able to assess and appreciate the value of 
organizational practices, structures and behaviors enacted by partners. In their study of the 
diffusion of innovative practices within health care organizations, Ferlie et al. (2005) produced 
similar findings. They found that social and cognitive boundaries created around professional 
groups, or communities of practices, favored the diffusion of clinical practices within those groups. 
Our results, however, show that the influence effects of membership in social groups, or settings, 
operate up to a point beyond which differentiation processes are activated that - we show ± produce 
different behaviors, and hence different outcomes. 
The strongest boundary around processes of network influence, however, is represented by 
the occupation of joint network positions. We found that as similarity in network positions that two 
organizations occupy increases, their interorganizational performance differentials decrease 
linearly. This result is coherent with the lack of cognitive processes of differentiation based on 
mutual awareness and direct contact that structural equivalence does not necessarily require in 
order to produce its (influence) effects. We interpret this result as evidence that the range of 
network influence is not confined within localized network substructures ± i.e., dyadic or sub-group 
network levels - but diffuses globally.   
We showed that these results are robust with respect to a considerable variety of factors that 
may be responsible for observed interorganizational performance similarities including competitive 
interdependence, similarity in institutional arrangements, structural features, and in capacity 
constraints.  
The results that we reported contribute to our understanding of interorganizational networks 
E\ VKRZLQJ KRZ ³ORFDO´ UHODWLRQ-EDVHG ³PLG-UDQJH´ VHWWLQJ-EDVHG DQG ³JOREDO´ SRVLWLRQ-
based) mechanisms jointly affect performance differentials between interconnected organizations. 
In the context of the continuing debate over the level at which network effects actually occur 
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(Mizruchi and Marquis, 2006), we showed that network influence is more likely to produce 
observable results at a global level. 
In a more speculative mode, our findings are relevant for the broader field of research on 
performance differences across organizations in industry. Economic theory predicts that 
performance differentials, if any, should disappear over time as a consequence of competition. In 
the long-run, any remaining differential would be due to rents extracted from idiosyncratic or non-
reproducible assets such as natural resources, or to barriers to entry and market power. The 
literature on interorganizational networks cited above stresses social processes grounded in social 
influence and learning which, though distinct in nature from competition, also produce a leveling 
effect and ultimately obscure performance differences. Persisting differences in performance, 
though often observed, are thus difficult to explain. 
Our study provides some fresh insight into the way network structures and positions may 
sometimes maintain performance differences. Similarity of positions in the network contributes to 
reduce performance differences, and so does social proximity as measured by co-membership in 
cliques; so far, our results are in line with the interorganizational networks literature. Yet, we also 
show that social proximity exerts a leveling effect only up to a point, after which over-
embeddedness widens performance gaps again. Over-embeddedness in network sub-groups at meso 
level thus seems to be a mechanism that can maintain, and possibly even increase, performance 
differences, beyond all other tendencies to reduce them. By bringing it to light, our work 
contributes to furthering reflection on the reasons of persisting differences across organizations. We 
are aware, however, that network effects are likely to be contingent on the specific context and the 
specific aspect of organizational performance that may be of interest in any one situation. It would 
thus be useful to perform further tests, in particular by using dynamic panel data, which would take 
into account the temporal dimension of processes of change and persistence. More complex, extra-
dyadic statistical interdependencies could also be taken into account.  
32 
 
We have focused on organizational learning as one possible effect induced by 
interorganizational collaboration, i.e., organizational learning, because we were interested in 
understanding the social mechanisms associated with performance assimilation. Clearly,  
interorganizational relations may be established for a variety of reasons such as, for example, the 
need to meet legal±political requirements (necessity), to reduce environmental uncertainty 
(stability), to economize on transactions (efficiency), to pursue common or complementary goals 
(reciprocity), to gain credibility and respectability through association (institutional), and to 
preserve autonomy (asymmetry) (Oliver, 1990). The results of our study extend naturally to other 
kinds of interorganizational collaboration, to the extent that these different motivations encourage 
and support sharing of knowledge and experiences between partners. Clearly, the empirical 
extension of our results is limited by the fact that we have chosen to observe only a specific kind of 
collaborative relation between hospitals. But hospitals collaborate also with other kind of health 
care organizations (for example, biological laboratories and primary care practices)  and patient 
exchange is obviously not the only form of collaboration. We focused on this specific relation 
because prior literature has documented the importance of relational coordination between hospitals 
via patient exchange (Lomi et al., 2014) and because prior research instructs us that patient 
exchange relations facilitate interorganizational learning by promoting the sharing of clinical and 
organizational information that would be otherwise difficult to obtain (Lee et al., 2011; Iwashyna 
and Courey, 2011). In our study this is important because interorganizational learning is the main 
mechanism underlying the reduction of interorganizational performance differentials that our 
analysis clearly documents.   
The main limitation of the study is inherent in the cross-sectional nature of the research 
design which prevents strong inferential conclusions. We have documented a number of statistical 
associations that are consistent with our hypotheses, but cross-sectional data do not allow us to rule 
out the possibility that organizations associate on the basis of similarity in performance, thus 
producing through social selection the result that we have ascribed to social influence mechanisms. 
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As it has been long recognized, only longitudinal research designs support analyses that may help 
do disentangle these two sub-processes of network evolution (Leenders, 1997). We note ± however 
± that the hypothesis of social selection on the basis of similarity in attributes would be consistent 
ZLWKDVWURQJ³VKRUWUDQJH´HIIHFWDWWKHG\DGLFOHYHO± the level at which social selection acts more 
directly. We do not find this result in our data as the strongest spillover effects are associated with 
joint occupancy of network positions that ± as we have shown ± are clearly distinct from direct 
dyadic relations. Also, social selection hypotheses would need to be based on the assumption that 
partner selection decisions are driven consciously and explicitly by considerations of performance 
similarity ± an assumption that does not seems plausible in the present study.  
Despite the potentially important limitations that we have highlighted, we think it is fair to 
say that the findings reported in this paper are useful as they invite reflection on the dual role of 
interorganizational networks both as barriers to, and as conduits for, performance spillover effects. 
Our study was motivated by fundamental questions about the range of network effects ± or about 
how far network-based processes reach out to affect interorganizational performance differentials. 
³4XLWHIDU´is the answer that the results reported in this study seem to support.   
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